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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this article is to assess to what extent the European Union Regional 
Policy (EURP) has altered the patterns of participation by the sub-national actors in 
the implementation of the policy in Greece. It does that through the deployment of 
the theoretical frameworks of Multi-level Governance (MLG) and the application of 
the principle of partnership. The principle of partnership has been an integral aspect 
of the regulatory framework governing the EURP and has remained so after all the 
reforms of the Structural Funds. The aim of the principle is to promote bottom-up 
democratic participation in the areas where the EURP programmes are implemented 
hence provide opportunities for more active involvement on behalf of the sub-
national authorities. In this way centralised patterns of policy making can be 
challenged towards the direction of participation closer to those envisaged by MLG. 
These processes however are mediated through domestic policy practices which in 
the case of Greece have been highly centralised and have remained so despite the 
EURP intervention. The evidence presented about the third programming period 
indicates that there has hardly been any turn towards MLG whilst the principle of 
partnership was only applied in a superficial way. An early assessment regarding 
these patterns about the current programming period indicates similar processes in 
action. These issues are particularly pertinent in light of the ‘Kalikratis’ plan that has 
followed the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan in modernising the sub-national authorities as well 
as the fiscal crisis that has engulfed Greece since 2009. It remains to be seen 
whether the combination of these forces can lead to anything other than the 
rescaling of governance in the direction of less spending and diminished capacities 
for the sub-national authorities or the substantive reorganisation of the regional and 
local authorities hence their improvement in terms of participation in the EURP 
programmes. The conclusion is that for this to happen, there is a need for the 
domestic reforms that relate with the decentralisation of administrative and fiscal 
competences to be strengthened and properly implemented so as to countenance 
the negative impact of the austerity measures imposed after the fiscal crisis of 2009.  
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Multi-level governance  
and the application of the partnership principle 
in times of economic crisis in Greece 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to assess the extent to which the European 
Union Regional Policy (EURP) has altered the patterns of participation by 
the sub-national (regional and local) actors in the implementation of the 
policy in Greece. The research approach adopted in the paper is broadly 
based on the new institutionalist literature and its application regarding 
the theoretical framework of multi-level governance and the 
implementation of the partnership principle. Since the inception of the 
modern Greek state, successive domestic governments have been highly 
centralised with very little autonomy given to authorities below the 
national level to express autonomous interests. Simultaneously, the 
bottom up demands for this type of participation did not materialise 
with the sub-national authorities finding it difficult to aggregate 
collective demands and assert their interests to the central government. 
As a result the Greek state and the resulting patterns of governance 
have been characterised as highly compound and unitary.  
The introduction of the programmes funded through the EURP has 
provided ample opportunities to alter these patterns. After the reform 
of the Structural Funds in 1989, the principle of partnership has been an 
integral aspect of the ‘added value’ encapsulated in the EURP. This 
stipulates the requirement for the formation of synergies between state 
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and non-state actors at all territorial levels affected by the programmes. 
The principle of partnership has remained an integral part in all the 
rounds of coordinated EURP, whilst the specific meanings that it has 
acquired – in terms of the stakeholders affected- broadened through 
time. Through these processes, the partnership principle intends to 
enhance aspects of Multi-Level Governance (MLG) in the recipient 
countries and improve the opportunities of the sub-national actors to 
participate in the implementation of the programmes affecting their 
area in equal terms.  
MLG has developed as a theoretical concept in order to describe the 
processes of European integration from the perspective of comparative 
governance. It postulates that contrary to the traditional theories of 
European integration, certain policy areas of the European Union (EU) 
entail significant responsibilities for non-central government actors. At 
its most obvious, the concept describes increased autonomy of political, 
administrative and civil society organisations that do not form part of 
the central government to get involved in the process of policy-making. 
Therefore, the MLG concept is related with the partnership principle 
since the idea of partnership is –amongst others- about participation 
from sub-national political levels to decision making. In other words the 
partnership principle -as designed by the EURP regulations- aims to 
enhance patterns of MLG in the recipient countries.  
To be sure, the principle of partnership has been mainly conceptualised 
in the relevant literature in order to delineate the patterns of 
participation from actors representing civil society. On the other hand, 
MLG has been deployed in order to conceptualise patterns of 
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governance from state actors at the sub-national levels. For the 
purposes of the article the two theoretical frameworks are amalgamated 
and it is assumed that there is a process of constant interplay between 
them. In empirical terms this is substantiated by the fact that according 
to EURP regulations the sub-national authorities can act as state actors 
in certain stages of the programmes and actors representing civil society 
organisations in others. For example, the Local Government Associations 
(LGAs) may act as intermediaries between the central state and non-
state actors in some cases. However, in other cases they may act as final 
beneficiaries hence having a bottom up role. Similarly, the non-central 
government actors represent the horizontal interests of their 
professional or other organisation when they participate in a Monitoring 
Committee (MC). However, they also play a central role in the 
implementation of a programme as they are supposed to monitor their 
implementation. Therefore, although the distinction between the aims 
of the principle of partnership and the theories about MLG are useful, it 
is postulated in the article that in empirical terms such distinction cannot 
be easily justified.   
The empirical aim of the paper is to identify to what extent the intended 
influences exerted by the partnership principle have materialised in the 
case of Greece and to what extent they led to more decentralised 
patterns of governance or whether the centralising tendencies of the 
Greek state and the limited capacity of the sub-national actors for 
collective action predominated. This question is particularly pertinent in 
light of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis engulfing Greece as well as the 
introduction of the programme for the reform of the country’s territorial 
administration; the ‘Kalikratis’ plan. The policy aims of the latter are 
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broadly similar to the aims of the partnership principle as the 
decentralisation of competences at the sub-national level is integral in 
this Plan. This would lead to patterns of decentralised MLG and 
improved participation of sub-national authorities. However, the 
unsustainable fiscal position that was revealed in 2009 has led to the 
country asking for the assistance of the so called troika, representing the 
Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central 
Bank. As part of the conditions for the release of this assistance, the 
troika demanded the significant rescaling of the Greek structures of 
governance. This involves significant cuts along horizontal lines which 
mean that the Greek state is currently undergoing significant cuts in the 
services that it provides and by definition these cuts involve the sub-
national authorities. The paper is structured as follows. The next section 
attempts an overview of the main issues involved in the theoretical 
framework of MLG and the application of the partnership principle. This 
is then followed by a discussion of the governance arrangements in 
Greece before the introduction of the third Community Support 
Framework (CSF). The fourth section discusses the applicability of MLG 
and the partnership principle in relation with the in relation with the 
third CSF. The sixth section has similar empirical objectives this time in 
relation with the programming period of the National Strategic 
Reference Framework (NSRF), which coincides with the introduction of 
the ‘Kalikratis’ plan and the imposition of the conditions regarding the 
rescaling of governance by the troika. The final part concludes by 
summarising the main issues discussed in the previous sections.  
 
  5 
2. Theorising multi-level governance and the partnership 
principle 
Hooghe and Marks (2001) have developed a conceptual framework 
regarding Multi Level Governance in relation with the governance 
arrangements promoted by the regulations governing the EURP. They 
identify MLG with the dispersion of authoritative decision making across 
multiple territorial levels as a result of a member state implementing the 
EU Regional Policy. This is also identified as a process of regionalisation 
through which sub-national actors are empowered to challenge central 
government’s decision making authorities. The interaction between 
these actors is both vertical and horizontal, with the former describing 
interactions between actors from the same layer of government and the 
latter with actors across layers. This research built on previous works by 
Marks (1993) who for the first time identified links between the 
supranational arrangements for EURP and the prospects for MLG and 
Hooghe (1996) who focused on the territorial dimensions of MLG at the 
level of the recipient countries. This view of EURP as challenging the 
domestic governance arrangements of the countries receiving structural 
assistance towards the direction of more participation by non-central 
government actors has gained increased popularity in the last ten years.  
Much research has been devoted to both the normative and conceptual 
implications of the term MLG as well as the empirical authentication of 
the significance of MLG. Regarding the theoretical and the normative 
discussions, Piattoni (2010) cautions against using MLG as an umbrella 
term that ends up covering the process of EU integration and its 
governance arrangements in general and abstract terms. Bache and 
Flinders (2004) discuss the applicability of the concept in describing the 
  6 
complex relationships that develop between the EU and the member 
states. They point out that the most important aspect of MLG is as a 
useful theoretical framework to describe these interrelationships from a 
perspective other than the traditional International Relations theories 
and/or neo-functionalism which were dominant in the discussions about 
the EU before the 1990s.  
About the quest for the empirical assessment of the term, there is a 
consensus that the concept of MLG is closely related with the 
implications involved in the partnership principle and that the 
application of this principle offers the opportunity for the promotion of 
‘real’ subsidiarity at the domestic level. Similarly, the consensus is that 
the influence exerted by the principle of partnership is varied, which 
produces differentiated patterns of MLG in the member states. This is 
the case in the comparative studies conducted by Paraskevopoulos et al. 
(2006), by Bache (Bache, 2010a, 2010b) as well as by Bachtler and 
MacMaster (2008). The latter focus on the impact of the EU Regional 
Policy in the regionalisation processes in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and conclude that the most optimistic accounts of 
MLG are not substantiated by the empirical reality. Although they accept 
the significant steps undertaken towards regionalisation in the CEE and 
the increase in the institutional capacities and visibility of the regions in 
these countries, they point towards the importance of previously 
established constitutional and political arrangements in providing 
obstacles to more sub-national involvement. Hence, they challenge the 
view that there is a direct link between EURP and the increase in sub-
national involvement at the domestic level arguing instead that a 
comparative assessment of such trends is needed. Similarly, in the final 
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evaluation of the programmes funded throughout the period 2000-2006, 
the authors find limited evidence to support the view that the EU 
Regional Policy has led to significant sub-national participation in the 
recipient countries, hence governance arrangements as those 
envisioned by the MLG literature. The assessment of the role played by 
the requirements entailed in the partnership principle in particular 
confirmed the results of an earlier study commissioned by the 
Commission regarding the application of the principle in the then 
member states that were receiving structural assistance (Tavistock 
Institute, 1999). Paraskevopoulos et al. (2006) observe similar patterns 
of differentiated adaptation in the internalisation of the opportunities 
for policy learning entailed in the regulations governing EURP. Thus, they 
find that pre-existing institutional infrastructures at national and sub-
national levels are the determining intervening variables for this process.  
In a similar vein, Bache (2010a; 2010b) links MLG with the principle of 
partnership through the deployment of sociological institutionalism as 
the most appropriate methodological framework that can capture the 
domestic effects of EURP. He identifies partnership with opportunities 
for learning by the domestic actors and treats MLG as an external 
stimulus towards the adoption of structures closer to those of a 
compound polity. In this context interaction between policy actors does 
not produce zero sum political results as it would have happened in a 
majoritarian political system. Instead, it offers a perspective in which:  
actors change their preferences through socialisation in a 
changing environment and ascribe shifts towards MLG to a 
learning process. (Bache, 2010b, p.4)  
  8 
A similar point is made by Bauer (2002) who points out that in 
comparison with the other principles governing the operation of the 
structural funds- concentration, programming and additionality- 
partnership is the only principle that does not have a purely managerial 
dimension. Although the importance of the relevant partners working 
together in order to achieve the desired objectives is presented as 
promoting the efficacy of the programmes, the enhancement of the 
democratic process is an unintended consequence. Bache (2010a) also 
points out that although partnership is usually dressed up by the 
Commission in technocratic terms, it is a highly political concept with the 
potential to shape values and democratic practices at different levels.  
Therefore, democratic accountability and effectiveness are considered 
as complementary policy objectives in the context of a programme and 
they enhance both the quality of the final product and the patterns of 
involvement by the sub-national authorities. More specifically, the 
enforcement of the principle of partnership aims at creating ownership 
of the programmes implemented, by motivating the actors with the 
relevant expertise to be involved in a practical manner in all stages of 
the implementation of a project (Molle, 2008). As the Commission puts 
it:  
By contributing their specific knowledge on a certain subject or 
region, their awareness of potential project applicants, partners 
can improve programme effectiveness by raising the efficiency 
of project selection. Generally speaking a widely drawn 
partnership leads to greater commitment and ownership of 
programme outputs and hence to a direct interest in the success 
of the programme. (CEC, 2005, p. 4)  
  9 
Nonetheless, not all actors are intended to have the same type of 
responsibility. Each of the participating organisations – the Commission, 
the member states, the regional authorities and the final beneficiaries 
(the respective project managers) – is assigned specific tasks in the 
process. They are asked, however, to cooperate with each other in all 
stages of the policy by each adopting the role that they are meant to 
play in accordance with the regulations in order to produce the most 
effective outcome. In practice, the institutional channel through which 
this takes place is the Monitoring Committees (MCs), which were 
established as part of the regional and sectoral OPs. These meet twice a 
year and representatives from socioeconomic interests express their 
views about the programme.  
Thus, MLG and the introduction of the principle of partnership offer 
significant opportunities for change in the domestic actor’s actions and 
reorientation of their practices towards more consensual patterns of 
decision making. There is a clear distinction between the opportunities 
offered by the partnership principle and the aims of the other three 
principles governing the operation of the Structural Funds 
(programming, concentration, additionality). However, despite the 
intended consequences of the partnership principle towards MLG it is 
made clear that when applied in the empirical reality the outcomes are 
varied. In this context Hooghe and Marks (2003) propose a useful 
analytical framework in order to organise the constituent characteristics 
of the different forms that MLG can take by distinguishing between two 
types of MLG. Type I MLG affects domestic policies in ways closer to 
those existing in a federal polity and specifically as envisaged by the 
studies on fiscal federalism (Oates, 1999), whilst Type II does so in ways 
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more consistent to those offered by neo-classical concepts of political 
economy. The main elements of each Type are described in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: Types of Multi-level Governance 
Type I Type II 
General purpose jurisdictions 
Non-intersecting memberships 
Jurisdictions at a limited number of levels 
System-wide architecture 
Task specific jurisdictions  
Intersecting memberships 
No limit to the number of jurisdictional 
levels 
Flexible design 
Source: Hooghe and Marks, 2003, p. 236.  
 
In Type II MLG the services offered by the government are limited and 
sub-national layers of administrations only provide very specific services. 
In Type I these services are broader and sub-national authorities play a 
more active role in delivering them. Also, the basic organising principle 
that determines the types of memberships developed in Type I is 
territorial affinities and memberships are nonintersecting. In Type II MLG 
group memberships can be intersecting and territorial affiliations play a 
limited role. Finally, the design of Type I MLG resembles that of the 
central state with clear divisions of power being established at all 
territorial levels. This is in contrast to Type II MLG which theorises a 
more flexible design as a result of the overlapping memberships 
achieved by social groups during their lifetime.  
Therefore, the characteristic patterns of application of the principle of 
partnership are linked with the constellations of the Types of MLG that 
exist in a country. Certainly, these two types are little more than ideal 
types describing the configurations of sub-national involvement, whilst 
their constituent characteristics are not mutually exclusive but may co-
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exist in a country. Nonetheless, it is safe to conclude that Type I MLG is 
consistent with more democratic participation by the sub-national 
authorities hence with the enforcement of the principle of partnership in 
ways closer to the ones intended by the relevant regulations governing 
the EURP. This is the theoretical hypothesis that is tested in the 
remainder of the paper.    
 
3. Patterns of governance and state-society interactions in 
Greece before the third CSF 
Overall, regarding the internal characteristics of the Greek state, it can 
be argued that it has historically been highly centralised, with a 
majoritarian political system, and with clientelism and politicisation 
hindering any possibility for its autonomy from the society and economy 
(Dertilis, 2005; Sotiropoulos, 1993). Regarding the relationships of the 
Greek state with the surrounding socioeconomic environment, 
clientelism and patrimonialism have been important factors mediating 
this interaction. This has been the case even though in legal terms the 
Greek bureaucracy has not been very different from its Northern and 
Western European counterparts. It has been an amalgam of influences 
from the main traditions of Western European statehood, albeit the 
Napoleonic centralised model of administration has been the blueprint 
for any other subsequent model. Nonetheless, the practices that were 
left over by the Ottoman tradition (patrimonialised and fragmented 
public services) have left the main legacy on which any other system was 
built (Hibou, 2005).  
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As regards the territorial division of powers of the Greek state which are 
of more relevance to the empirical aims of this paper, it can be argued 
that on the whole, the Greek state has traditionally been centralised in 
the way it has managed its territorial capacities (Psycharis and Simatou, 
2003). Indeed for some commentators it is the most centralised state in 
Europe (Featherstone and Yannopoulos, 1995) and it has been so since 
its establishment in 1830 (Ioakimides, 1996; Chlepas, 1999). Reflecting 
the general difficulty of the Greek state to allow the articulation of 
interests emanating from civil society but also the lack of bottom up 
demands of this kind, regional interests have traditionally struggled to 
obtain governmental resources in a democratic and pluralistic manner so 
as to achieve their objectives.  
The implementation of the first CSF followed the reform of the 
regulations governing the Structural Funds in 1988 and the signing of the 
Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. Both these institutional 
developments at the EU level entailed the expansion of the EU’s 
competence in the area of the EURP. The introduction of the four 
principles governing the operation of the programmes- partnership, 
additionality, programming and concentration- had significant 
implications about the pre-existing governance structures of the 
recipient countries. As a result of the principles introduced with the first 
CSF, the government had to submit to the Commission a Regional 
Development Plan (RDP) that would entail the developmental priorities 
of the first CSF. This had to be drawn up in consultation with the regional 
and local actors involved in each regional and sectoral OP. After the CSF 
had been adopted, the national and regional authorities were required 
to revise the general developmental plans into specific Operational 
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Programmes (OPs). Overall, the Ministry of Economy’s regional policy 
department became the principal institutional actor implementing the 
first CSF (Ioakimides, 1996). The imperative of absorbing the funds at the 
stated time overrode any processes of collaboration between the central 
institutional actor and the regional and local stakeholders (Andreou, 
2006).  
Similar patterns were established during the second programming 
period (1994-99). The election of the modernising wing of the socialist 
government in 1996 and the assignment of the hosting of the 2004 
Olympic Games in 1997 resulted to the adoption of a style of 
management more attuned towards the absorption of the funds at the 
expense of bottom up participation (Paraskevopoulos, 2008). However, 
a series of reforms promoted by the Greek government after 1994 
further contributed to the territorial reorganisation of the Greek state. In 
1997, Law 2503/97 on the ‘Organisation and Management of the 
Regions’ provided further responsibilities to the NUTS II regions in the 
areas of planning, preparation and execution of programmes of 
economic development, and social and cultural affairs. Essentially, this 
was putting into practice the 1986 Law that had introduced the regions 
and had not been fully implemented (Petrakos and Psycharis, 2006). 
These reforms sought to establish regional and local authorities which 
were insulated from central political interference.  
Furthermore, in 1994 a new law established local elections for the 
leaders of the prefectures and the prefecture councils. Therefore, for the 
first time in modern Greek political history the local populations would 
have the opportunity to choose their representatives at the local level 
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democratically. The prefecture councils were comprised by members of 
the civil societies representing each prefect and were also elected. 
Nevertheless, this movement towards decentralisation was 
accompanied by the transfer of resources to the non-elected regions 
whilst the elected prefectures would continue to be financially 
dependent upon the central state (Psycharis and Simatou, 2003). 
Additionally, there was confusion about the responsibilities that the 
prefectures actually had.  
Finally, at the lowest territorial level, that of the LGAs, the government 
attempted to modernise the system of local government by 
amalgamating municipalities and communes. From the existing 6,000 
independent LGAs, the new Law reduced the number of the 
municipalities to around 1,000 and some competences were transferred 
from the central state to the newly created LGAs. This was the 
‘Kapodistrias’ plan, which provided for the obligatory mergers of the 
local communes. The changes in the territorial distribution of powers in 
the Greek state are summarised in Table 2 which provides an outline of 
the institutional developments that took place at the governmental level 
concerned with the administration of the CSFs.  
TABLE 2: Tiers of Local Government and decentralised structures in 
Greece  
 Municipality and 
Communes  
 First tier of self-
government (Local 
NUTS V tier). 325 
 Fully elected 
 Underwent drastic amalgamation in 1999 through the 
‘Kapodistrias’ plan. 5825 municipalities and communes 
(438 and 5387 respectively) became 1033 municipalities 
and communes (900 and 133 respectively) 
 After the ‘Kalikratis’ plan, 325 new municipalities are 
created. Municipal council also operates, both are 
elected.  
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 Prefecture  
 Second tier of self-
government 
(prefecture NUTS III 
tier) scrapped with 
‘Kalikratis’  
 
 Led by a single Prefect appointed by the central 
government until 1982 
 Increased participation with appointed members in the 
Prefectural Council established in 1982. The Prefect 
remains appointed by the central government. 
 Since 1994 fully elected tier of self-government.  
 Unofficial operation as part of the Regional Authority 
 Region  
 Third tier of 
decentralisation 
(regional NUTS II 
tier)  
 13 Regions and 7 
Decentralized Units. 
Corresponds to 13 
regional 
Operational 
Programmes   
 Non- existent until 1986 
 Legislated in 1986 but did not fully function until 1997 
 Fully functional since 1997 with a Secretary General 
appointed by the central government and appointed 
members of the Regional Council. 
 After 2011 fully elected Regional secretary runs the 13 
regions together with a fully elected regional council. 
The 7 decentralized units are run by a secretary general 
appointed by the central government.  
Adopted and updated from Psycharis and Petrakos (2010)  
On the whole, the ways in which the principle of partnership was 
implemented by Greece during the second CSF and the progress made 
towards the adoption of practices as envisaged by Type I MLG is 
contradictory. On the one hand there were indisputable reforms 
promoting decentralisation and improving the effectiveness of the 
management of the programmes. The new governmental structures 
could provide effective and high quality support to the official 
management and monitoring structures of the regional and sectoral 
OPs. Moreover, the fact that the NUTS II regions were finally 
consolidated with the competences and financial resources decided in 
the 1986 legislation was a step towards the inclusion of the regional 
populations in the implementation processes of the CSF. Additionally, 
the election of the prefectures and the amalgamation of the LGAs could 
provide channels for local actors to participate in all stages of the 
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regional OPs and hence significantly improve the input provided by the 
intermediate bodies and the final beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the fact 
that it took the central government ten years to endow the regions with 
the responsibilities established by the structural funds regulations 
provides an example of the central state’s reluctance to lose any of its 
powers and successfully move towards the direction indicated by the 
partnership principle. As a study initiated by the Commission (Tavistock 
Institute, 1999) for the implementation of the principle of partnership in 
the member states shows:  
There is in Greece an emerging deconcentrated structure which, 
however, co-exists alongside a more centralised system of 
control and centralised operational service delivery… the 
regional secretaries exercise the regional element of the central 
government. 
 
4. Patterns of MLG and of the application of the partnership 
principle in the third CSF 
To what extent did the initiation of the third CSF alter the previously 
established patterns regarding the implementation of the principle of 
partnership and the adoption of Type I MLG? The trend towards 
managerial efficiency as shown by the quest for the absorption of the 
funds intensified during this time (Paraskevopoulos, 2008). This has 
resulted in significant recentralisation processes taking place, which 
diminished any opportunities for more participation by sub-national 
policy actors hence any trend towards Type I MLG.  
During this period there were no further domestic reforms in the 
reformulation of the political geography of the country. Nevertheless, 
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this is not the case with the institutional developments that emanated 
from the EURP. The reform of the Structural Funds in 1999 and the 
increase in financial resources that became available for Greece 
provided a further impetus towards the sub-national participation of the 
local governments in Greece. In particular, in institutional terms the 
reforms initiated with the 1260/1999 regulations entailed the creation of 
an organisational scheme with constitutional independence from the 
central state. For Greece this entailed managing and paying authorities 
and the strengthening of the processes of monitoring, evaluation and 
control in both sectoral and regional levels. I have shown elsewhere 
(Chardas, 2011) that the introduction of this network had limited effects 
for the governance arrangements of the Greek state. The remaining 
section focuses on the impact that this new organisational scheme had 
regarding the enforcement of the principle of partnership in particular.   
Broadly, the institutional network created in order to support the design 
and implementation of the Greek third CSF comprised five interrelated 
organisations: the Managing Authorities (MA), the Monitoring 
Committees (MC), the Payment Authority (PA), the Committee for Fiscal 
Control and the Management and Organisation Unit (MOU).  The CSF 
MA was given responsibility for the general running and coordination of 
the programme. Essentially, this was the Ministry of Economy’s regional 
policy department which had been in charge during the three previous 
programming periods. Under the third CSF it was endowed with 
significant administrative and financial resources that enhanced its role. 
The CSF MA was undoubtedly the most important institutional actor in 
the network, responsible for the design and implementation of the 
programme. Its employees were highly experienced and some had been 
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involved in the EURP since the start of the IMPs.  The CSF MA was 
responsible for the administration of the partnership and additionality 
principles. Moreover, it participated in the MCs of all the sectoral and 
regional OPs and was supervised by and accountable to the CSF MC. In 
addition to the CSF MA, a new MA was established in the relevant 
regions or the ministries for each OP, which was headed by a director 
general who was appointed by the central government. 
Moving to the second important institutional actor of the institutional 
network set up in order to design and implement the third CSF in 
Greece, the Monitoring Committees (MCs) were also reorganised and 
their role became more clearly identified. As in the previous 
programming periods, the aim of creating the MCs was the 
institutionalisation of the principle of partnership and the improvement 
of the inclusion of representatives from civil society in the design and 
implementation of the CSF. In accordance with the developments 
related to the strengthening of the principle of partnership as decided 
with the reform of 1999, there was an extension of the participating 
bodies representing sub-national civil societies at the regional level and 
national civil society organisations at the national level. Furthermore, 
the tasks to be performed by the MCs were clearly identified for the first 
time. Each OP was assigned a separate MC which would monitor the 
implementation of the respective programme. The progress of the third 
CSF as a whole was monitored by the CSF MC, which encompassed the 
director general of the CSF MA, the presidents of the MCs of each 
sectoral and regional OP, representatives from the PA and the 
Committee for Fiscal Control and representatives of economic and social 
interests. Finally, a delegate from the Commission attended the 
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meetings of the CSF MC but did not have a right to vote. The regional or 
sectoral MCs worked in a similar way as the CSF MC with the 
representatives coming from the regions and the MAs where the OP was 
implemented in the first case or national delegates in the latter. In all 
cases a representative from the ministry of economy participated. The 
Head of the regional or sectoral MC was appointed by the central 
government. Therefore, the two main pillars of the institutional network 
that was created to support the operation of the third CSF were the MAs 
– one for the CSF and one for each OP – and the MCs – also one for the 
CSF and one for each OP.  
The establishment of the MAs and the MCs were undoubtedly positive 
steps towards the improvement of the performance of the regional and 
sectoral OPs and the amelioration in the patterns of enforcement of the 
principle of partnership. However, the fact that the MAs were placed 
under the direct control of the ministries and the regions responsible for 
the implementation of the sectoral and regional OPs signalled the 
reinforcement of the centralising tendencies of the Greek state. As 
mentioned above, the secretary general of each MA was appointed by 
the central government and at the same time would also serve as the 
head of each MC.  
Overall, the Ministry of Economy would constantly interfere in the 
operations of the regional MAs through the CSF MA but also through the 
regional MC. However, this was not seen as necessarily negative or 
indeed as contributing to the ineffectiveness of the system. This is 
because of the severe difficulties that the sub-national authorities were 
facing in terms of properly trained personnel. Therefore, despite the 
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significant opportunities that the introduction of the independent 
administrative network for the management of the third CSF had for 
greater involvement by the sub-national authorities, the centralising 
tendencies of the Greek state predominated. As with the previous 
programming periods, the central state reaffirmed its predominance 
over the sub-national authorities. The concerns for the absorption of the 
funds and the effectiveness of the CSF as a whole resulted in the limited 
input from sub-national policy actors. This was the case even though in 
addition to the external reforms, the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan regarding the 
decentralisation of the Greek structures of governance was consolidated 
in this period. This plan enhanced the responsibilities of both the 
prefecture and the local government authorities and it could have had 
significant impact regarding the application of the principle of 
partnership and the adoption of institutional structures closer to Type I 
MLG in Greece. Nevertheless, this has hardly been the case as the 
central state distrusted their ability to contribute effectively to the 
implementation of the regional OPs. 
 
5. Patterns of MLG and of the application of the partnership 
principle in the NSRF 
Starting from January 2011 the territorial divisions of power were 
altered once again in Greece. The previous system that was comprised 
by 13 NUTS II regions, 54 prefectures and 1033 Local Government 
Associations (LGAs) as was decided with the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan is now 
replaced by 13 regions, 325 municipalities and 7 decentralised 
administrative units. Under the new legislation implemented under the 
‘Kalikratis’ Plan, the prefecture level is scrapped as an administrative and 
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political unit and all its responsibilities are transferred to either the 
newly created regional authorities or to the LGAs. The 13 regional 
authorities are democratically elected as are the 325 municipalities. The 
7 decentralised units are run by the central government via a General 
Secretary appointed centrally.  
This new political geography was introduced in 2011, whilst the fourth 
round of coordinated assistance funded by the structural funds has 
started in Greece since 2007. This is the National Strategic Reference 
Framework (NSRF) which replaced the previous programming 
documents of the Community Support Frameworks (CSF). As part of the 
NSRF 20, 42 billion euros in total (2006 prices) was allocated to Greece, 
whilst the number of Operational Programmes (OPs) has been reduced 
to 13, which cover eight sectoral OPs and five regional ones. Five out of 
the 13 new regions receive less funding under the NSRF compared to the 
other eight because they enter the phasing-in status, i.e. they will stop 
being treated as Objective 1 regions under the EURP after 2013.  
These changes in the allocation of the OPs were not followed by 
significant institutional alterations in the management and monitoring 
system of the NSRF. Specifically, the previous Managing Authorities 
(MAs) of the 13 ROPs remained as intermediate MAs, which are now 
coordinated by a central MA placed under the ministry of economy with 
specific remit the coordination of the actions of the ROPs. This authority 
also has responsibility for the coordination of the actions taken by the 
sectoral OPs that fund European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
projects. Thus, the newly created five ROPs do not have their own MA 
but are to be implemented through collaboration between the 
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Intermediate MA of the 13 regions. Similarly, the Monitoring 
Committees (MCs) remain at the level of the 13 regions. At the sectoral 
level, those areas that continued receiving structural assistance have 
their own MA placed in the relevant ministry. Therefore, regarding the 
institutional and administrative units responsible for the management 
and implementation of the NSRF in Greece there will be 13 regional 
Intermediate MAs and MCs and five sectoral MAs that are created as a 
direct result of the changes in EURP.  
Simultaneously, after 2011 as part of the ‘Kalikratis’ plan, at the NUTS II 
level there will be 7 decentralised administrative units governed directly 
through the central government and 13 democratically elected regional 
authorities the boundaries of which correspond to those of the 
Intermediate MAs. At the local level there will be 325 municipalities 
which are also elected democratically. Each municipality will be ran by a 
mayor and a municipal council that are appointed after local elections 
held every 5 years. Municipalities are further sub-divided in municipal 
units, which have their own council but no decision making authorities 
other than providing consultations to the municipal councils.  
The regional authorities will be run by an elected regional governor and 
a regional council similarly elected every 5 years. This is the first time 
that regional elections are planned to take place in Greece since the 
previously existing regional authorities only operated as management 
units for the CSFs and had no democratic mandate being run by the 
central government. Although the previously existing prefectures are 
scrapped, they remain as an unofficial territorial unit (regional units) 
headed by a vice-regional governor appointed from the same political 
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organisation from which the Regional Governor and the Regional Council 
are drawn. Finally, the 7 decentralised administrative units comprise two 
or three regions each (except for Attica and Crete) and are ran by a 
centrally appointed General Secretary. She is assisted by an advisory 
council comprised by the regional governors and representatives of the 
municipalities.  The political geography of the country as it has been 
determined with the territorial reforms and the implementation of the 
structural funds is presented in Table 2. 
In parallel to these institutional developments relating to the application 
of the principle of partnership and the creation of Type I MLG, since 
2009 Greece has been facing an unprecedented fiscal crisis. The 
parameters of this crisis develop daily and a multitude of factors both 
domestic and international determine their outcomes. What is of 
relevance to the empirical aims of this paper is that after the country’s 
public finances reached unsustainable levels, the troika representing the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank was called in by the Greek government in order 
to provide a bailout plan. This has involved the release of financial 
assistance to cover the borrowing costs of the country in exchange for 
significant reforms that the Greek government is conditioned to 
implement. The troika has repeatedly asserted that it is for the Greek 
government to choose the policy instruments that can lead to the 
fulfilment of its conditions.   
Clearly, the aims of the ‘Kalikratis’ plan regarding the modernisation of 
the sub-national administration of Greece are consistent with the aims 
about the decrease of government costs. Reducing the number of sub-
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national administrations will decrease the overall government outlays 
hence provide more opportunities for cost-cutting. Hence, the tension 
between the need for more sub-national involvement and efficiency 
concerns, this time regarding the need to cut the costs of the public 
administration in general as was identified in the previous programming 
periods, continues to affect the NSRF. This is the case particularly since 
the newly introduced sub-national authorities continue to enjoy limited 
autonomy to collect and manage their own revenues. They are still 
predominantly dependent on the central government to finance their 
expenditures hence are unavoidably affected by developments 
concerning the fiscal situation of the central government.   
Therefore, although it is early to make proper assessments, there is little 
doubt that the austerity measures adopted by the Greek government as 
condition for the release of the financial bailouts by the troika will hurt 
the already limited funds available to the decentralised units introduced 
with the ‘Kalikratis’ plan. This by definition will cancel any impact that 
this plan would have regarding the application of the principle of 
partnership and the adoption of policy structures similar to the ones 
envisioned by Type I MLG. If anything, more centralisation is the most 
likely outcome of this interaction.  
True, the rescaling of governance introduced by the troika cannot be 
seen as axiomatically leading to less government spending at the sub-
national level. To the extent that the latter are financially dependent 
upon the central state it could be argued that, as a percentage, the sub-
national authorities will receive the same funds as before. Thus, despite 
the decrease in the total funding available, the sub-national authorities 
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will not suffer disproportionately. Consequently, the outcome of the 
introduction of the austerity measures in the domestic governance 
arrangements that relate with the sub-national authorities will be 
mediated by the extent in which the cuts will be accompanied by 
meaningful territorial reforms that would allow more fiscal and policy 
autonomy to the sub-national authorities.  
On the other hand, the fact that the introduction of the NSRF was not 
accompanied by any institutional changes also points towards the 
strengthening of centralisation processes in Greece. The management 
system for the implementation of the NSRF is essentially the same with 
the one that managed the third CSF. Therefore, the creation of the 13 
decentralised regions did not alter the role of the relevant Managing 
Authorities, which as mentioned above in the NSRF operate as 
Intermediate MAs. However, these 13 Intermediate MAs do not 
implement ROPs relevant to their areas since there are now 5 ROPs that 
consist of the separate 13 regions which previously were all of Objective 
1 status. Thus, the Intermediate MAs manage, implement and monitor 
through the regional MCs programmes that are not of their area. 
Moreover, no further competences were allocated to the Intermediate 
MAs, the operation of which will be monitored by an organisation that 
will work as part of the Ministry of Economy. This will be a separate MA 
with the remit to coordinate the actions of the regional MAs. In addition 
to that, most large ministries located in Athens will introduce new 
coordination authorities to oversee the operation of the regional MAs in 
their area of interest. The regional units will now have to acquire the 
consent of the ministerial authorities in order to amend any project.  
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Given the already complex nature of the system that was created with 
the NSRF it is difficult to identify the logic behind the creation both of 
the unit in the Ministry of Economy and of the coordination authorities 
in the line ministries. Again, although it is early for proper assessments, 
it is hard not to conclude that the central government’s aim is to control 
the actions of the regional MAs hence cancel any effects aimed by the 
principle of partnership. Further on this, as was discussed earlier, note 
that the Monitoring Committees are the institutionalisation of this 
principle. Therefore, apart from any effects towards the improvement of 
the level of participation by the sub-national authorities as they are 
achieved through the MAs, actors representing regional civil societies 
have the opportunity to directly influence the OPs through the MCs. 
However, as with the previous programming periods, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the MCs are anything other than consultative 
bodies with very limited resources at their disposal. They meet 
infrequently (usually not more than once a year) and can hardly 
influence the patterns of governance for the regional OPs which in any 
case are not those of their area. Because of the introduction of the 5 
new ROPs and the fact that the regional MCs remained 13, the 
representatives of regional civil societies participating in the latter are 
not the same as the ones affected by the ROP. These flaws in the design 
of the ROPs only serve to exacerbate the difficulties in social dialogue 
identified at the sub-national level that were discussed about the third 
CSF in Greece.  
Moreover, the difficulties in the capabilities of the Local Government 
Associations (LGAs) to participate in equal terms in the implementation 
and monitoring of the projects implemented in their area has not been 
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affected by the ‘Kalikratis’ plan (Sotirelis and Xiros, 2010). The number of 
the LGAs was reduced and their constitutional role was enhanced but 
the main institutional steps that could be taken in order to improve their 
operations were not taken. As with the regional authorities, they remain 
financially dependent on the central government a fact that diminishes 
any chance for them to formulate autonomous decisions. Moreover, 
their operation continues to be characterised by clientelism, corruption 
and factionalism which further diminish genuine citizen participation 
(Getimis and Hlepas, 2010). The deployment of non-transparent 
practices in the selection of projects –the LGAs can participate in the 
implementation of the ROPs as final beneficiaries- (Andreou, 2010) only 
serves to justify the central government’s distrust towards more 
participation by the local authorities.             
Furthermore, the introduction of the 7 decentralised regional units is 
clearly an effort by the Greek government to reassert the control of the 
operation of the regional authorities and follows the example of the 
Kapodistrias plan that was introduced in the 1990s. In that occasion, the 
prefecture and the local levels were given democratic legitimacy but the 
13 regional structures were unelected and centrally governed. Thus, 
there is continuation of the trend of providing decentralisation and 
allowing more autonomy to the sub-national actors with the one hand 
whilst reasserting central government control with the other. Certainly, 
this reaffirmation of control by the central government is justified as 
part of an effort of the CSF MA to hasten the rates of absorption of the 
funds. Corruption, lack of transparency and limited administrative 
capacities of the local and regional levels present significant obstacles in 
the implementation of the ROPs hence the programme as whole. As the 
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central government is responsible for the absorption of the available 
funds it ends up overriding any sub-national involvement in order to 
avoid forfeitures. The interplay between these centralising and 
decentralising forces create a chicken and egg situation and it is not clear 
whether the reduced responsibilities of the sub-national authorities or 
the centralising attitudes of the central state are responsible for its 
reproduction. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper attempted to discuss the extent to which the introduction of 
the EU Regional Policy has altered the patterns of participation by the 
sub-national authorities in Greece. It put forward the argument that the 
adoption of Type I Multi level governance would lead to the 
enforcement of the principle of partnership in ways closer to those 
described by the relevant regulations of the structural funds. This 
hypothesis guided the paper and the conclusion is that despite the 
opportunities offered by the structural funds, the mediating impact of 
the centralised Greek state and the weak civil society proved 
detrimental in limiting the adoption of structures close to Type I MLG. 
Before the introduction of the principle, with the reform of the 
regulations in 1989 the Greek state has been centralised and allowed 
limited scope for bottom involvement in governing sub-national affairs. 
Moreover, the bottom- up demands for this short of participation had 
been limited with the sub-national authorities struggling due to lack of 
resources, restricted administrative capacities and most importantly 
limited opportunities for horizontal expression of territorial interests.    
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The decentralisation reforms that have been implemented in Greece 
during the 1990s have done little to alter these dynamics. This is the 
case because every measure that would decentralise competences at 
the sub-national level was accompanied by recentralisation by the 
central government. Moreover, together with the issues concerning 
decentralisation, issues about central economic policy would end up 
overriding any such dynamics. Similar issues can be identified with the 
latest wave of decentralisation reforms introduced through the 
‘Kalikratis’ plan, which gave considerable autonomy to the regional 
authorities whilst simultaneously creating 7 decentralised administrative 
units with no democratic mandate. The creation of these units can only 
be explained in ways similar to the creation of the unelected regional 
authorities with the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan in the 1990s. At the time the 
prefectural and local levels were assigned democratic legitimacy whilst 
the central government imposed the 13 unelected regions. Moreover, 
the ‘Kalikratis’ plan did little to address the most serious issue facing 
local governments in Greece which is their fiscal autonomy from the 
central state.  
The introduction of the NSRF in 2007 without any institutional 
modifications to reflect the changed regional classification of structural 
funds assistance serves similar purposes. Greece is now in a situation 
where there are five Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs) that are 
implemented by 13 Intermediate Managing Authorities which 
correspond to different territorial units than the ones of the ROPs. The 
operations of the intermediate MAs are controlled by the Ministry of 
Economy and other central ministries after the establishment of a 
relevant MA and line MAs in each of the major ministries working from 
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Athens. Finally, and probably most importantly, the severe financial 
crisis affecting the country since 2009 has provided the central 
government with more arguments to cut public services. This will hurt 
the lower territorial levels by rescaling their governance arrangements 
to favour the central government. Therefore, another issue of central 
economic policy will put forward considerations of efficiency that will 
override any efforts for decentralisation.  
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